rihai 写了: 2025年 7月 26日 12:11
笑死叔了
你老板私下问你,你想不想要它的办公室, 你丫就真信了?
蒋梅毒要求共治是对的, 最佳回复
结果呢, 霉菌连共治都没同意, 根本就是逗你玩
蒋梅毒看的很清楚
LOL
Why Roosevelt made Chiang this offer, despite himself having announced the principles of the Atlantic Charter of not taking the spoils of war, is an interesting question. It does in any case reveal his unilateral, top-down style of decision-making by not consulting with nor relying on the State Department's territorial studies with near disastrous results. One explanation of Roosevelt's approach to Chiang regarding the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands seems to be that he may have actually believed China wanted the Ryukyu Islands. Indeed, as the Chinese summary record shows, their conversation was conducted in the context of the "restoration of territories." Roosevelt, the evidence suggests, was aware of China's various claims to the Ryukyu Islands, mostly seen in editorials in the nationalistic press, but also seen in comments by Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, the older brother of Chiang's wife, all of which, while inconsistent in nature, had been reported by U.S. Embassy officials in China, and had received coverage in the international and U.S. press.
Soong, at his first official press conference as Foreign Minister on November 3, 1942, publicly called for the recovery of the Ryukyu Islands (as well as Manchuria and Formosa).("The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State (November 5, 1942)," FRUS, 1942, p. 174.) So we see that it was not only vocal semi-official newspapers but government spokesmen that expressed the desire to see the Ryukyu islands "restored" to China. (Years later these claims would still be heard. The controversy regarding Chiang Kai-shek's book, China's Destiny, where a phrase relating to the Ryukyu Islands was later hastily added in the second edition, is well-known. Regarding China's views on an early peace treaty with Japan, and if I remember correctly, territorial claims, see Chang Hsia-hai, "The Treaty with Japan: A Chinese View," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3 [April 1948], pp. 505-514.) It was with this belief, perhaps, that Roosevelt asked Chiang about the Liuchiu Islands. Had Roosevelt actually bothered to read the State Department memorandums on Okinawa's territorial status, he would have known that Chinese control was not considered a viable option for the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands.
Roosevelt may have had other reasons for asking Chiang as well. Roosevelt's approach suggests his method of dealing sternly and strictly with enemy states, as the call for "unconditional surrender" would suggest, while at the same time raising the status of the Allied countries, particularly China, as Japanese historian Iokibe Makoto suggests. (Iokibe Makoto, "Kairo Sengen to Nihon no Ryodo [The Cairo Declaration and Japanese Territory]," Hiroshima Hogaku [The Hiroshima University Law Review], Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4 (March 1981), p. 127. Iokibe's article later formed a large part of Chapter 4 in his award-winning 1985 book, Beikoku no Nihon Senryo Seisaku [U.S. Occupation Policy for Japan], Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 1985.) Roosevelt may have been trying to strengthen China's confidence by showing Chiang that he considered China to be one of the Four Great Powers, one of the "Four Policemen" that Roosevelt was hoping would guarantee the security in the postwar world. Indeed their very meeting was representative of this belief. In that sense, Roosevelt, never a fan of Japan, may have been hoping for Chiang's help in limiting Japan's regional power and territorial size and hoped that the transfer of the Ryukyu Islands to Chinese control would contribute to that goal. Roosevelt likely as well was seeking to punish Japan, mistakenly believing that the Ryukyu Islands were taken or stolen from China by Japan, and thus felt that stripping the islands from Japan would be justified and not subject to his own Atlantic Charter.
The final version of the Cairo Declaration, issued on November 27 by the three leaders, strongly suggests this latter possibility. It reads:
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all territories, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.